More than $3 trillion in digital assets could eventually become vulnerable to theft within the next four to seven years, according to a new report from Project Eleven.
Project Eleven focuses on post-quantum security and migration for digital assets and recently announced a collaboration with the Solana Foundation to prepare its network against the threat of quantum computing.
“The digital asset industry holds over $3 trillion in aggregate value, and virtually all of it is secured by the same class of cryptographic primitive: elliptic curve digital signatures,” which are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, the report said.
But it is not only crypto that is at stake here. The report states that the same public-key cryptography security used by bitcoin, ether and stablecoins also underpins banking systems, cloud infrastructure, authentication networks and military communications.
The 110-page report by Project Eleven, whose CEO Alex Pruden was on stage at Consensus Miami 2026, also states that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could use Shor’s algorithm to derive private keys from public keys, allowing attackers to forge signatures and take over control of wallets and digital accounts secured by the elliptic curve cryptography.
This means blockchains, banking infrastructure, cloud systems, military comms and other digital identity systems are also vulnerable, not just bitcoin, ethereum, stablecoins, and other blockchains, the report emphasizes.
Project Eleven says a “Q-Day” scenario, the arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computer cable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography, could be as early as 2030, no later than 2033.
“Our analysis suggests that, based on current trends, Q-Day is more likely to occur than not by 2033, and potentially even as soon as 2030,” the report reads. “The window for the world to migrate to post-quantum cryptography is narrowing.”
And here is why it is becoming so complicated, the report explains: large systems often take between five to more than 10 years to migrate, depending on how complex their networks are.
Another difficult challenge is how the transition actually takes place, as migrating all quantum vulnerable systems and blockchains to secure networks involves a process that requires a coordinated, simultaneous transition from all users, exchanges, custodians, wallet providers and miners.
Read more: To freeze or not to freeze: Satoshi and the $440 billion in bitcoin threatened by quantum computing
“The gap is not technical,” the report says. “The gap is entirely coordination, urgency, and willingness to accept the costs of migration.”
When it comes to Bitcoin, things get even more complicated because upgrades historically move slowly and often become politically contentious.
“The Bitcoin SegWit upgrade — a relatively modest change compared to PQC migration — took over two years from proposal to activation (2015-2017) and triggered a contentious chain split,” the report recalled.
Read more: What the Fork? Why Bitcoin Tech Changes Impact Price
“The distributed nature of blockchain networks means that migration to post-quantum cryptography may take the better part of a decade, longer than other centralized systems.”
Pruden, who authored the report along with CTO Conor Deegan, warned that Bitcoin’s migration to post-quantum cryptography could prove even harder than Taproot because it would require coordinated action across users, exchanges, custodians and miners. He also said he personally leaned toward “recycling” the 5.6 million to 6.9 million vulnerable BTC tokens, worth up to roughly $500 billion at current prices back into the bitcoin’s supply curve rather than allowing a quantum attacker to eventually sweep them.
The report by Pruden’s Project Eleven ultimately acknowledges that the issue creates tension between bitcoin’s fixed-supply ethos and its commitment to property rights.
Read more: Bitcoin’s quantum debate splits as Adam Back pushes optional upgrades over forced freeze
